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3.  FOFs  help  big  LPs  in  downward  scaling,  so  that  these  LPs  can  ramp  up  their  private  equity 
investments quickly?  Downward scaling can also mean that large LPs can collapse many tedious 














































and  booms  –  can  draw  upon  a  rich  set  of  theories.  My  focus  is  on  highlighting  where  theories  offer 
conflicting predictions, so that this paper can shed light on them using the FOF setting. 
Returns 






















holding, unlike  inexperienced  LPs, and  they  do  not  require  GPs  to  fill  bulky questionnaires,  unlike the 










































studied  by  Chevalier  and  Ellison  (1997)  and  Chen,  Hong  and  Kubik  (2004).  They  suggest  three  more 
predictions.  First, FOF‐using LPs, as principals, must have the tool to ensure that FOFs as agents indeed 
exert  the  appropriate  amount  of  effort.  That  tool  is  high‐powered  incentives.  In  my  case,  the  specific 
prediction is that the use of FOFs would increase the chance of an LP not investing in a follow‐on FOF in the 
same series for poor performance, a test suggested by Lerner, Schoar and Wong (2004).  This sensitivity 










need  to  ramp  up  its  private  equity  investments.  The  peculiarity  of  the  situation  is  that  working  with 















hands  of  the  party  that  has  a  comparative  advantage  in  capabilities  (in  this  case,  in  moving  fast).  By 
outsourcing to FOFs, LPs also do not have to build enormous capacity during the sparse investment points 
and  capital  calls,  only  to  have  the  capacity  underutilized  at  other  times.   Both  of  these  are  efficiency 
arguments, and are covered in the previous discussion on outsourcing.  Therefore, I do not repeat any testing. 
Governance 






LPs  might  also  use  FOFs  as  stepping  stones  into  less  familiar  investment  areas.  A  common  learning 





area  of  investing.  I  use  an  SUR  (seemingly  unrelated  regression)  estimation  to  control  for  the  many 


























































Public  Employees  Retirement  System,  (12)  Los  Angeles  City  Employeesʹ  Retirement,  (13)  Massachusetts  Pension 
Reserves  Investments,  (14)  Minnesota  State  Board  of  Investment,  (15)  NACUBO,  (16)  New  York  State  Teachersʹ 
Retirement  System,  (17)  Norsk  Vekst  Forvaltning.,  (18)  Oregon  State  Treasury,  (19)  Oregon  University  System,  (20) 






































































































































(US),”  should  be  considered  the  same  GP.  The  answer  depends  on  how  3i  organizes  itself,  so  it  is 
information  that  is  difficult  to  obtain  for  all  GPs.  By  inspecting  the  4,849  corporate  names,  location, 
investment, scope, and vintage, I am able to hand‐code two distinct variables: one that classify GPs broadly 
at  the  holding  group  level  (GPglobalID)  and  another  at  the  local  organizational  level  (GPlocalID).  This 




















































Institutions,  Foundation,  and  Government,  those  for  the  corrected  Model  (2)  are,  also  in  order, 
Consultants/Gatekeepers, Government, and Educational Institutions. 
3 –  Comparing  FOF Usage with Non‐usage.  The previous result is more encouraging in terms of FOF 



































































are  in  our  earlier  dataset.  There are 18  in  this  last  group,  out of  the 709  we  have  earlier.  I  check  for 



























































































































































Table  18  shows  the  existence  of  this  trade‐off  between  “spreading  out  over  many  FOFs,  risking  mis‐
coordination” and “not staging investments in one FOF, risking being held up.”  The dependant variable is a 











effort  (although  that  in  itself  is  subject  to  free‐rider  problems  –  e.g.,  Bolton  and  Scharfstein  (1996)).  
Empirically, therefore, it appears that the dominant force is the former, leading to a positive coefficient. 






enormous  capacity  during  the  sparse  investment  points  and  capital  calls,  only  to  have  the  capacity 






















































Table 1 - Example Funds of Funds 
This table shows a few examples of the larger funds of funds.  GP means general partner, LP means limited partner, and vintage means when the fund started. 
 
 
GP Fund  Nation  State  Vintage
Size 
($mil) Example  LPs` 
1  Capital Z Investment Partners (FKA: Capital 
Z Partners, Ltd) 
Capital Z Investments, L.P.  US  NY  1998  1500  Zurich Financial Services 
2  Swiss Life Private Equity Partners Ltd  Swiss Life Private Equity Holding  SZ    1997  1500  Swiss Life 
3  Swiss Life Private Equity Partners Ltd (fund 
now owned by Alpha Assoiates) 
5E Holding (Excellence in Eastern Emerging 
Equity) 
SZ    1998  1500  Allgemeine Pensionskasse der SAirGroup, 
Adroit Investment AG, 
Basler Lebensversicherungsgesellschaft, 
Pensionskasse des Basler Staatspersonals 
4  Thomas Weisel Partners, LLC  Thomas Weisel Global Growth Partners  US  CA  2000  1300  CalPERS 
5  Lexington Capital Partners  Lexington Capital Partners II  US  MA  1999  330  Pomplemousse, L.P. 
Lakeview Direct Investments, Inc. 
Franz and Frieder Burda 
6  Great Hill Equity Partners, LLC  Great Hill II  US  MA  2000  330  First Union Capital Partners, Inc. 
Heller Financial, Inc. 
7  Auda Securities GmbH (Main Office)  Auda Capital II L.P.  US  NY  1998  312  Henry Luce Foundation, Inc. 
8  Goldman, Sachs & Co.  Goldman Sachs Private Equity Partners II, 
L.P. 
US  NY  1998  250  Southern Company Services, Inc. 
Warner-Lambert Company 
9  GTCR Golder Rauner LLC  Golder Thoma Cressey Rauner II  US  IL  1984  235  Security Benefit Life Insurance Co. 
Pack River Investment Company 
10  Leonard Green & Partners  Green Equity Investors III  US  CA  1999  215.7  Citicorp Alternative Investment Strategies 
Jackson National Life Insurance Co. 
Grand Avenue Associates, L.P.   27
Table 2 – Comparison of Datasets by Source 
This table compares the number of observations from the main sources used in the table.  The column “How many more 
here?” means the number of times the “dataset in this paper” (last row) is bigger over the source in the row.  IRR means 
“internal rate of return.” 
 
 Funds 


























8,317 1.2x  0  -  1,900  2.1x  5,191 3.0x 
Private Equity 
Intelligence  1,782 5.4x  1,516 1.1x         
Alternative Assets 
Galante  1,609 6.0x  0  -  404  9.7x  7,003 2.2x 
Other sources – e.g.: 
LPs, websites  3,141* 3.1x  2,077* 0.8x  3,953 1.0x  4,442  3.5x 
Dataset in this paper  9,659  1.0x  1,734  1.0x  3,927  1.0x  15,514  1.0x 
* Include observations that are also in other sources. 
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Table 3 – Summary Statistics for LPs 
This table summarizes the information about limited partners (LPs).  Panel (a) compares LPs who are also funds of funds 
(FOFs) from those who are not, such as non-financial corporations, government funds, etc.  Panel (b) compares in an 
orthogonal way, showing LPs who use FOFs and those who do not.  “Num of PE funds” means the number of private 
equity funds in which an LP invests.  If the LP invests through FOFs, this number includes the private equity funds held by 
the FOFs.  “Num of FOFs” is the number of FOFs employed by an LP.  “Col%” are percentages by column and “Row%” 
are by row.  Dollar amounts are in millions unless otherwise stated. 
 
(a) FOFs and non-FOFs 
 All  FOFs  Non-FOFs 
Variable  N  Mean S.D.  Min Max  N  Mean S.D. Min Max  N  Mean S.D. Min Max 
Total obs  3,927       709      3,218       
Year  started  2,502  1,991 7 1,935 2,004  588 1,998 4 1,979 2,004 1,914  1,989 7 1,935 2,001 
Assets managed  2,628 2,727 12,363  0  300,000 600  335  595  1  6,744 2,028 3,435 13,992 0  300,000
Num of PE funds  2,400  6.6  18.4  1  410  325  9.6  12.8  1  125  2,075  6.2  19.1  1  410 
Num of FOFs  2,377  0.5  1.9  0  33  301  0.1  0.3  0  2  2,076  0.5  2.0  0  33 
Max num of LPs 
 in FOFs  3,834  2.0 8.2  0  58  616  0.7 3.3  0  27  3,218  2.3 8.8  0  58 
Allocation  to:                      
Stocks  857 46.1 14.5  2  95  0          857 46.1 14.5  2  95 
Fixed  income  846 31.5 12.5  0  100  1  9.8  .  10  10  845 31.5 12.5  0  100 
Private  equity  556 5.5 16.5  0  100  9  82.1 36.8  0  100 547 4.2 12.6  0  100 
FOFs  89 43.8 37.0  0  100  0          89 43.8 37.0  0  100 
LP class  N  % col  N  % col  N  % col 
Non Fin. Corp  862  25.9      862  32.8 
Government 718  21.5      718  27.3 
Fund of Funds  709  21.3  709  100.0     
Investment Banks  385  11.5      385  14.7 
Educational Inst.  176  5.3      176  6.7 
Insurance 145  4.4      145  5.5 
Banks/Fin. Corp.  142  4.3      142  5.4 
Foundation 91  2.7      91  3.5 
Other Non Profits  52  1.6      52  2.0 
Consultants 15  0.5     15  0.6 
Others 40  1.2      40  1.5 
Total 3,335  100.0  709  100.0  2,626  100.0 
Continent N  Col%  Row%  N  Col%  Row%  N  Col%  Row% 
Americas 3,432 90  100  515  83  15  2,917  91  85 
Europe 348  9  100  98  16  28  250  8  72 
Other 46  1  100  9  1  20  37  1  80 
 3,826  100    622  100    3,204  100   
US state (top few)  N  Col%  Row%  N  Col%  Row%  N  Col%  Row% 
NY 469  14  100  125  24  27  344  12  73 
CA 376  11  100  85  16  23  291  10  77 
MA 307  9  100  68  13  22  239  8  78 
IL 258  8  100  54  10  21  204  7  79 
CT 197  6  100  100  19  51  97  3  49 
TX 163  5  100  15  3  9  148  5  91 
 
Amounts are in million dollars. 
   29
(b) FOF-users and non-users 
 
 All  FOF-users  Non-users 
Variable N  Mean  S.D.  Min Max  N  Mean S.D. Min Max  N  Mean  S.D. Min Max 
Total obs  3,927 4,739 1,704  1  12,639  414  4,705 1,267 2  7,007  3,513 4,743 1,749 1  12,639
Year started  2,502  1991  7  1935 2004  314  1989  8  1935 2001  2,188  1991  7  1936 2004 
Assets  managed 2,628  2,727  12,363 0  300,000 324  10,656 28,059 1 300,000 2,304  1,612  7,337 0 142,339
Num of PE funds  2,400  6.6  18.4  1  410  413  20.0  37.4  1  410  1,987  3.9  8.5  1  153 
Num of FOFs  2,377  0.5  1.9  0  33  414  2.7  3.7  1  33  1,963  0.0  0.0  0  0 
Allocation  to:                          
Stocks  857  46.1  14.5 2  95  171  53.7  14.8 3  89  686  44.2  13.7 2  95 
Fixed  income  846  31.5  12.5 0  100  172  28.2  11.7 7  84  674  32.4  12.6 0  100 
Private  equity  556  5.5  16.5 0  100  194  5.4 12.9 0  100 362  5.6  18.1 0  100 
FOFs  89  43.8  37.0 0  100  89  43.8  37.0 0  100  0         
Max num of LPs 
 in FOFs  3,834 2.0  8.2  0  58  414  18.6  17.6  0  58  3,420 0.0  0.0  0  0 
LP class  N  % row  % col  N  % row  % col  N  % row  % col 
Non Fin. Corp  862  100  26  86  10  21  776  90  26 
Government 718  100  22  93  13  23 625  87  21 
Fund of Funds  709  100  21  31  4  8  678  96  23 
Investment Banks  385  100  12  16  4  4  369  96  13 
Educational Inst.  176  100  5  106  60  26  70  40  2 
Insurance 145  100  4    -    123  85  4 
Banks/Fin. Corp.  142  100  4  15  11  4  127  89  4 
Foundation 91  100  3  17  19  4  74  81  3 
Other Non Profits  52  100  2  11  21  3  41  79  1 
Consultants 15  100  0  1  7  0 14  93  0 
Others 40  100  1  27  68  7  35  88  1 
Total 3,335  100    403  100    2,932  100   
Continent  N  % row  % col  N  % row  % col  N  % row  % col 
Americas 3,432 100  90 366 11  93  3,066  89  89 
Europe 348  100 9  25  7  6  323  93  9 
Other 46  100  1  2  4  1  44  96  1 
Total 3,826    100  393    100  3,433    100 
US state (top few)  N  % row  % col  N  % row  % col  N  % row  % col 
NY 469  100  14  47  10  13  422  90  14 
CA 376  100  11  36  10  10  340  90  11 
MA 307  100  9  26  8  7  281  92  9 
IL 258  100  8  27  10  8  231  90  8 
CT 197  100  6  21  11  6  176  89  6 
TX 163  100  5  18  11  5  145  89  5 
 
Dollar amounts are in millions unless otherwise stated.   30
Table 4 – Summary Statistics for Funds 
This table summarizes information about private equity funds, including funds of funds (FOFs).  “$ in PC” means the 
amount invested in a portfolio company.  If the fund is an FOF, the information like “Round ave” and “$ in PC, ave” are for 
rounds and portfolio companies via the investee funds of the FOF.  “Yrs between close to 1st investment” is the number of 
years from the close of the fund to the year of its first investment, whether in a private equity firm (for non-FOFs) or fund 
(for FOFs).  “Excess IRRs” are IRRs deviations from the benchmark IRR of funds grouped by: (1) vintage, (2) stage (e.g., 
early versus mezzanine), (3), investment scope (e.g., venture capital versus distressed debt), and (4) continent (e.g., 
Americas versus Europe).  Dollar amounts are in millions unless otherwise stated. 
 
 All  FOFs  Non-FOFs 
Variable  N  Mean  S.D. Min  Max  N  Mean  S.D. Min  Max  N  Mean S.D.  Min  Max 
Total obs.  9,659  6,685  4,109  1  12,776  709 2,558  2,516 1  12,639 8,950  7,012  4,033 277  12,776
Vintage  6,624  1,992 9 1,947 2,004 588 1,998 4  1,979 2,004  6,036  1,991 9 1,947 2,004 
Size 8,441  239  1,883  0.100  95,549  600 335  595 0.800  6,744  7,841  231  1,947 0.100 95,549
Size targeted  2,745  264  503  0.200  5,235  208 352  447 5.000  3,200  2,537  257  507  0.200 5,235 
Round ave  6,270  5  23  0.002  1,040  136 6  10  0.004  88  6,134  5  23  0.002 1,040 
Round max  6,270  20  104  0.002  3,757  136 22  56  0.007  500  6,134  19  105  0.002 3,757 
Round min  6,270  2  19  0.000  1,040  136 2  5  0.001  49  6,134  2  19  0.000 1,040 
$ in PC, ave  6,270  6  25  0.002  1,040  136 7  11  0.004  88  6,134  6  25  0.002 1,040 
$ in PC, max  6,266  21  107  0.002  3,757  136 23  56  0.007  500  6,130  21  108  0.002 3,757 
$ in PC, min  6,266  2  19  0.000  1,040  136 2  6  0.001  49  6,130  2  19  0.000 1,040 
Num of rounds  6,516  22  37  1  647  140 22  38  1  278  6,376  22  37  1  647 
Num of PCs  6,586  13  18  1  310  210 13  18  1  125  6,376  13  18  1  310 
Sequence num, by
series  9,659 1  1  1  14  709 2  2  1  14 8,950 1  1  1  14 
Sequence num, by
GP  5,987 4  6  1  67  402 7  7  1  36 5,585 4  6  1  67 
Date  closed  6887 29oct91 3143 01jan58 28sep04 314 24dec97 1,925 01may78 28sep04 6,573 13jul91 3,150 01jan58 23sep04
Yrs between close 
to 1st investment  5,376 1  3  -40  35  101 1  3  -13  9  5,275 1  3  -40  35 
Yrs between 1st to 
last investment  5,376 6  7  0  52  101 4  5  0  22 5,275 6  7  0  52 
IRR  (%)  1,734  6.3  41 -100  535  162 2.7  27  -96  93 1,572  6.7  43 -100  535 
Excess IRR (%)  1,734  5.1  41  -100  532  162 2.7  26  -98  88  1,572  5.4  42  -100  532 
Invest scope  N  % row  % col  N  % row  % col  N  % row  % col 
Advising 2  0.0 100.0      -  2  0.0  100.0 
All 927  17.7  100.0  30  10.0  3.2  897  18.1  96.8 
Buyout 1,049  20.0 100.0  116 38.5  11.1  933  18.9 88.9 
Co-investment 3  0.1  100.0      -  3  0.1  100.0 
Development 21 0.4  100.0      -  21 0.4  100.0 
Distressed 39  0.7  100.0     -  39  0.8  100.0 
Fund of Funds  24  0.5  100.0  22  7.3  91.7  2  0.0  8.3 
Industry 86  1.6 100.0      -  86  1.7  100.0 
International 3  0.1  100.0      -  3  0.1  100.0 
Venture Capital  3,091  58.9  100.0  133 44.2  4.3  2,958  59.8  95.7 
Total 5,245  100.0   301 100.0    4,944  100.0   
Stage  N  % row  % col  N  % row  % col  N  % row  % col 
Seed 252  3 100  1  1 0.4  251  3  100 
Early 2,030  25 100  12  9  1  2,018  25 99 
Mezzanine 241  3  100  6  5  2  235  3  98 
Expansion 747  9  100  1 1  0.1 746  9  100 
Late 2,605  32  100  95  71  4  2,510  31  96 
All 2,394  29  100  18  14  1  2,376  29  99 





 All  FOFs  Non-FOFs 
Owner type  N  % col    N  % col    N  % col   
PRIV 5,628  62          5,628  67   
FINCORP  877  10         877  10  
CORPVEN 815  9          815  10   
SECFOF 709  8    709  100    59  1   
IBANK 708  8          708  8   
INDIV 101  1          101  1   
SBIC  59  1             
DEVEL  39  0.4         39  0.5  
ADV  37  0.4         37  0.4  
PENSION  36  0.4         36  0.4  
GOVT  30  0.3         30  0.4  
ENDOW  20  0.2         20  0.2  
UNIV  14  0.2         14  0.2  
PUBLIC  11  0.1         11  0.1  
EGRN  4  0.0         4  0.1  
Total  9,088  100   709  100    8,379  100  
Continent  N  % row  % col  N  % row  % col  N  % row  % col 
Americas 7,183  78  100  515  83  7  6,668  78  93 
Europe 1,245  14  100  98  16  8  1,147  13  92 
Others  751 8  100  8 751  1  751 8  100 
Total  9,179  100   622  100    8,557  100  
US state (top few)  N  % row  % col  N  % row  % col  N  % row  % col 
CA 1,668  23  100  CA  85  16  5  CA  1,583 
NY 1,440  20  100  NY  125  24  9  NY  1,315 
MA 793  11  100  MA  68  13  9  MA  725 
CT 392  5  100  CT  100  19  26  TX  340 
IL 384  5  100  IL  54  10  14  IL  330 
TX 355  5  100  TX  15  3  4  CT  292 
 
Primary investor types: 
ADV = advisors who are non-FOFs 
CORPVEN = corporate ventures 
DEVEL = development programs, including community programs 
EGRN = evergreen funds 
ENDOW = endowments and foundations 
FINCORP = financial corporations, including those of government affiliates 
GOVT = government programs, both national and state 
IBANK = investment banks and their venture subsidiaries 
INDIV = individuals and families 
PENSION = pension funds, corporate and public 
PRIV = private partnerships 
PUBLIC = public firms 
SBIC = Small Business Investment Companies, including MESBIC, public SBIC 
SECFOF = secondary partnerships and FOFs 
UNIV = university programs   32
Table 5 – Summary of Means for LP-fund Pairs 
This table summarizes the means of limited partner (LP) and fund pairs.  Panel (a) shows the breakdown by LP type, panel (b) by whether the LP in the LP-fund pair is a user of funds 
of funds (FOFs).  In the “Allocation” columns, “Eq” means equities, “Fixed Inc” fixed income, “Priv Eq” private equity.  “# of PC” is the number of portfolio companies in the fund of the 
LP-fund observation.  If the fund is an FOF, then it includes the portfolio companies of the investee funds of the FOF.  “Seq num” is the sequence number of the fund, whether by fund 
series or general partner (GP).  “Excess IRRs” are IRRs deviations from the benchmark IRR of funds grouped by: (1) vintage, (2) stage (e.g., early versus mezzanine), (3), investment 
scope (e.g., venture capital versus distressed debt), and (4) continent (e.g., Americas versus Europe).  “Weighted IRR” use commitment by the LP to the fund as a percentage of the 
total commitment by the LP to private equity funds as weight.  Standard errors in brackets are corrected for heteroskedascity.  Dollar amounts are in millions unless otherwise stated.  
* Although some non-users indicate a link to FOFs, their allocation to them is zero, so I retain their status as non-users. 
(a) By LP Type 
     LP Fund 
      Allocation  # of PC   Seq num  IRR  Weighted IRR 
LP type  Fund 
type 










Fund Excess For 
LP 
Fund Excess
Total  All 15,514  20,466.0 52.7 26.3 7.0 18.8 3.9 57.6 792.0  2.0  5.9 8.2 4.7 3.2  21.7  3.2  0.7 
 Buyout  5,256  22,951.0 52.6 26.6 7.3  17.8 4.0  62.0  1,333.0  1.7  5.0  10.0 1.9  -1.4  10.4  0.9  -2.5 
 Focused  528  24,130.0 52.8 26.3 5.8  15.4 4.2  55.4  1,235.0  1.8  4.7  11.8 9.1  0.1  1.0  9.1  -0.1 
 FOF  1,432  24,046.0 54.1 27.5 5.7  27.6 7.1  55.9  692.0  2.4  8.8  -0.4 -1.5 0.9  41.9  -6.8  -9.7 
 Mixed  2,446  17,462.0 52.7 26.5 7.4  16.7 3.4  54.5  621.0  2.1  6.6  9.3 5.1  2.5  27.4  -2.1  -5.1 
 VC  5,037  17,867.0 52.2 25.7 7.0  17.9 3.2  56.4  347.0  2.3  6.4  9.0 8.7  10.3  25.6  15.0 15.6 
Consultants  All  105  2,215.0   9.8  53.5 6.8  0.1  18.6  634.0 2.0  6.1  4.9 3.4       
  Buyout 37  2,364.0   9.8  53.1 6.8  0.1  18.6  1,035.0  1.9  4.3  5.0 1.8       
 Focused  4  2,308.0     37.3 6.8  0.3  14.0  965.0  1.8  7.3    4.7  -4.1       
 FOF                                   
 Mixed  19  1,875.0   9.8  47.2   -  20.3  534.0  2.0  6.4    -18.9 -22.0       
 VC  41  2,390.0   9.8  56.9 6.8  0.0  18.6  313.0  2.2  7.4    14.7 15.8       
Educational Inst  All  1,960  19,331.0 45.5 22.2 8.2  9.8  2.6  59.7  750.0  2.3  6.5  12.7 11.0 10.0  23.4  1.9  0.3 
 Buyout  539  25,431.0 43.8 20.5 9.3  5.8  2.4  66.7  1,400.0  1.8  5.2  5.0 0.7  -2.4  11.2  20.2 17.1 
 Focused  84  24,400.0 44.9 23.0 5.3  5.5  2.6  51.2  1,307.0  1.9  5.1  -6.9 8.1  -0.6  -12.3  11.6 2.7 
 FOF  234  11,694.0 55.3 26.1 4.5  31.1 4.2  28.1  455.0  2.1  9.8  10.8 13.5 13.2  48.6  -11.4 -13.1 
 Mixed  273  17,909.0 45.7 23.3 7.3  9.4  2.6  62.8  592.0  2.4  6.6  14.8 7.4  4.6  27.0  19.4 16.4 
 VC  756  18,377.0 45.1 22.5 8.8  9.0  2.5  62.4  389.0  2.7  7.2  20.6 20.4 22.6  26.3  23.3 22.5 
Financial  Inst  All 2,498  11,396.0 13.0 70.0 6.5  27.2 1.0  31.4  623.0  1.9  5.3  24.0 4.0  1.9   5.7  3.7 
 Buyout  960  11,845.0 14.5 68.6 7.7  26.1 0.9  37.2  1,029.0  1.7  4.6    2.9  -0.4    5.5  2.6 
 Focused  66  10,746.0     5.6  34.5 0.8  15.7  815.0  1.7  3.9    5.1  -3.7       
 FOF  137  15,647.0 6.0  76.2 7.6  43.0 3.0  26.5  683.0  2.8  8.7    -9.9 -5.8    -0.6  -2.1 
  Mixed 381  11,066.0 18.6 65.1 8.1  18.3 1.2  36.2  451.0 1.8  5.0  3.7 1.0    -3.3  -6.3 




     LP Fund 
      Allocation  Num of investees   Seq num  IRR  Weighted IRR 
LP type 
Fund 





Foundation  All 543  2,841.0 51.8 25.6  2.5  26.8 0.8  20.4  701.0  2.1  6.5    10.8 9.4    -10.4 -12.6 
 Buyout  156  3,104.0 50.9 26.6  2.7  26.8 0.7  21.1  1,301.0  1.8  5.5    1.6  -1.0    -7.3 -9.9 
 Focused  37  1,540.0 51.4 21.3  4.0    0.5  12.1  1,311.0  1.9  4.8    6.3  -2.6       
 FOF  34  2,123.0 57.9 22.7  1.9  35.8 2.1  13.5  777.0  2.7  7.7    -11.1 -8.7    -20.2 -21.9 
 Mixed  79  2,737.0 52.9 26.5  1.3  25.2 0.9  21.8  351.0  1.6  6.5    9.8  6.8    -14.2 -17.3 
 VC  214  3,183.0 51.2 26.1  2.6  26.3 0.6  23.1  328.0  2.5  7.6    22.2 23.8    -9.3 -8.5 
Fund of Funds  All  2,723  422.0    9.8  66.6    0.1  21.7  812.0  2.3  6.1  20.2 -0.3 -0.4    -21.7 -16.3 
 Buyout  831  449.0    9.8  65.4    0.2  20.2  1,429.0  1.7  5.1  282.0 -1.0 -4.5       
 Focused  22  623.0      100.0    0.2  19.1  1,759.0  1.7  5.7    11.1 2.0       
 FOF  124  429.0      100.0    0.4  21.6  1,160.0  4.4  7.6  -8.9 -19.1 -10.2       
 Mixed  558  467.0    9.8  70.5    0.1  20.7  660.0  2.5  6.8    1.8  -0.6       
 VC  1,128  377.0    9.8  56.9    0.1  23.1  390.0  2.4  6.4    1.1  4.2    -21.7 -16.3 
Government All  4,669  40,872.0 54.6 27.8  6.0  17.9 10.0  121.6  983.0 2.0  5.8  6.2  3.8  2.1  11.7 2.2  -1.8 
 Buyout  1,804  41,272.0 54.4 28.0  6.0  17.3 9.6  118.1  1,525.0  1.8  5.0  9.6  2.2  -1.1  7.8 -0.2 -3.8 
 Focused  179  40,773.0 55.6 27.5  5.9  14.5 9.6  115.1  1,311.0  1.6  4.7  14.6 13.4 4.2  9.6 10.6 1.7 
 FOF  565  40,845.0 53.4 27.6  5.7  19.8 12.4  106.7  767.0  2.1  8.4  0.2  -3.8 -2.1  -4.4 18.9 -2.4 
 Mixed  668  37,946.0 54.1 27.6  6.4  17.0 9.6  120.7  736.0  2.1  7.1  6.4  6.4  3.7  32.7 -9.0 -12.0 
 VC  1,225  41,371.0 55.1 27.7  5.7  19.5 10.0  133.8  380.0  2.2  6.0  3.7  6.3  7.5  19.2 16.8 18.0 
Non-Fin Corp  All  2,533 13,096.0 60.2 25.5  4.1  21.9 1.6  19.4  663.0  1.8  5.8  24.0 6.5  4.3    3.3  0.5 
 Buyout  799  12,567.0 59.7 26.3  3.9  21.4 1.7  23.0  1,152.0  1.7  4.7    3.9  0.8    -1.4 -5.1 
  Focused 100  11,841.0 57.2 27.5  3.4 18.6 1.5  19.4 1,232.0  1.9  4.5    6.0  -3.0   12.2 2.3 
 FOF  231  15,232.0 60.5 25.7  5.1  35.2 4.2  21.7  604.0  2.1  10.5    2.6  5.2    -2.9 -2.2 
 Mixed  412  11,356.0 60.6 25.4  3.6  16.9 1.2  17.1  605.0  1.8  7.2    6.9  4.1    1.1  -2.0 
 VC  771  14,578.0 61.0 23.8  4.0  15.4 1.2  19.9  257.0  2.0  6.0  24.0 10.4 11.1    17.2 17.5 
Other Non Profits All  294  4,434.0 49.7 22.9  9.6  23.1 2.7  22.4  851.0  2.2  6.5    3.7  2.3    12.9 10.3 
 Buyout  91  4,695.0 50.3 21.0  10.5    2.0  20.9  1,490.0  1.8  6.1    -1.5 -4.3    4.9  2.3 
 Focused  22  2,366.0 45.8 29.6  5.7    2.0  15.4  1,036.0  1.6  3.8    5.6  -3.3    7.7  -1.1 
 FOF  38  4,391.0 52.0 21.7  12.3  23.1 5.9  24.3  675.0  2.5  10.9    5.8  4.9    15.3 13.6 
 Mixed  38  3,224.0 49.5 22.9  7.2  23.1 2.3  21.4  645.0  2.1  6.1    15.3 12.6    46.5 43.4 
 VC  103  5,162.0 49.3 23.5  10.2  23.1 2.5  25.2  388.0  2.5  6.9    2.6  4.6    11.7 13.7 
Other All  189  4,404.0 54.6 39.1  0.0  100.0 2.2  10.8  571.0  2.1  6.9    6.8  4.7       
 Buyout  39            0.1  9.7  831.0  1.6  6.7    2.5  -0.6       
 Focused  14            -  7.6  1,259.0  1.9  5.1    5.6  -3.2       
 FOF  68  2,692.0     0.0  100.0 5.9  7.5  472.0  2.3  9.6    4.7  3.7       
 Mixed  18  22,500.0     0.0  100.0 0.1  15.4  653.0  1.8  4.0    -2.9 -5.6       
 VC  46  22,500.0     0.0  100.0 0.3  15.9  252.0  2.6  8.0    15.9 16.2       
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 (b) By FOF-usage 
     LP Fund 
      Allocation  # of PCs   Seq num  IRR  Weighted IRR 
FOF usage 




Eq FOF FOFs Funds  Size 
By 
series By  GP 
For 
LP Fund  Excess
For
LP Fund Excess
FOF-users All  8,243  31,134.0  53.0  26.8  6.5  18.8 7.3  90.0  873.9  2.0  6.0  7.6  5.0  3.4  21.7 1.5  -1.1 
 Buyout  2,876  33,612.4  52.9  27.1  6.7  17.8 7.4  93.7  1,425.9 1.8  5.0  8.7  1.5  -1.7  1.0 12.2 2.3 
 Focused  313  33,420.8  53.3  26.4  5.9  15.4 7.0  84.4  1,249.6 1.7  4.6  11.6 10.7  1.6  41.9 -6.8 -9.7 
 FOF  1,284  26,063.9  54.1  27.5  5.8  27.6 7.9  59.5  619.4  1.9  8.4  -0.4 3.1  4.0  27.4 -5.5 -8.5 
 VC  2,289  30,723.6  52.6  26.3  6.2  17.9 7.1  98.7  374.3  2.3  6.4  9.0  9.8  11.3  25.6 12.1 12.7 
 Mixed  1,141  29,591.9  52.6  26.7  7.1  16.7 7.3  94.4  711.0  2.1  7.1  9.3  5.2  2.6  10.4 1.4  -2.0 
Non-users All  7,271  4,269.0  51.6  24.4  8.4  0.0  0.0  20.8  701.3  2.1  5.9  34.7 4.4  3.1    7.8  5.3 
 Buyout  2,380  5,150.7  51.5  24.2  9.3  0.0  0.0  23.8  1,222.8 1.7  4.9  70.0 2.3  -1.0    -0.9 -4.3 
 Focused  215  4,202.7  51.1  25.7  5.4  0.0  0.0  13.2  1,217.1 1.9  4.8  21.5 6.4  -2.5    7.7  -1.1 
 FOF*  148  2,775.3  53.7  26.4  4.8  0.0  0.0  24.7  1,300.0 6.2  10.0    -20.7  -12.1    -29.8 -26.0 
 VC  2,748  4,085.2  50.9  23.6  8.9  0.0  0.0  21.2  326.0  2.3  6.5  9.1  7.7  9.4    19.5 20.1 
 Mixed  1,305  3,120.4  53.2  25.8  8.0  0.0  0.0  19.6  544.9  2.1  6.2    5.0  2.4    4.7  1.6 
  LP type                                
FOF-users Consultants/Gatekeepers  4,584  103.4      19.6  6.8  1.0  6.0  44.1  1.7  1.0    20.6  17.8       
  Educational  Institutions  4,998  22,790.8  45.3 22.7  7.0 9.8 3.6  69.6  724.2  2.2  6.5 12.7 11.2 10.1   0.4 -1.1 
 Financial  Institution  4,996  16,728.5  13.0  70.0  5.4  27.2 3.8  42.6  720.6  1.9  5.8    2.1  -0.3    5.9  3.5 
  Foundation  4,626  4,703.0  48.8  30.7 1.1  26.8 2.0  30.0  540.6  1.8  6.7   12.9  11.8    -9.1 -11.3 
 Fund  of  Funds 2,292  759.0      100.0   1.3  30.2  1,011.4 2.0  5.4  -8.9 -10.3  -10.5       
 Government  4,868  43,415.6  54.7  27.6  6.2  17.9 11.0  130.3  976.0  1.9  5.8  6.2  4.3  2.5    1.6  -1.9 
  Non Financial Corp  4,754  18,831.6  60.2  25.7  4.7  21.9 3.5  35.9  864.5  1.9  6.3    3.4  1.4    1.9  -0.8 
  Other  Non  Profits  4,483  6,535.8  52.2 19.9 13.7  23.1 4.8  32.9  779.6  2.4  7.0    2.7  2.4    18.2 17.9 
 Other  6,429  4,578.7      0.0  100.0 5.6  6.7  402.9  1.8  7.8    10.8  10.0       
Non-users Consultants/Gatekeepers  4,236  2,360.8    9.8  55.9    0.0  19.4  671.7  2.0  6.2    4.5  3.0       
  Educational  Institutions  4,690  10,159.9  45.8 21.0 10.9    0.0  33.6  816.8  2.5  6.5    10.5 9.6    22.5 19.9 
 Financial  Institution  4,759  7,601.4      8.0    0.0  27.3  587.5  1.8  5.1  24.0 4.8  2.7    5.5  3.9 
 Foundation  4,640  1,628.7  54.1  21.8  3.3    0.0  14.1  807.8  2.3  6.4    9.6  8.2    -14.5 -17.2 
 Fund  of  Funds 2,865  377.2    9.8  40.9    0.0  20.7  788.8  2.3  6.2  282.0 0.9  0.8    -21.7 -16.3 
  Government  4,672 14,130.4  53.2  29.6  3.4    0.0  37.6  1,049.2 2.2  6.0  6.5  -0.6  -2.6   7.3  -0.8 
  Non Financial Corp  4,668  4,813.8  60.1  25.0  2.9    0.0  5.6  488.9  1.7  5.4  24.0 9.5  7.2    17.7 14.4 
  Other  Non  Profits  4,420  1,545.8  42.1  32.5  4.0  0.0  8.8  940.2 1.9  6.0   4.9 2.1   12.9 10.3 
 Other  4,399  728.8  54.6  39.1  0.1    0.0  13.4  671.8  2.3  6.7    5.9  3.5       
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Table 6 – Performance of FOF among Funds 
This table uses OLS for models (1) through (3) and the Heckit procedure for (4) through (6), whose selection model is: 
ProbabilitySelected = βo + β1.log(FundSize) + β2.FundVintage + β3.RoundAverage + Σβ4.MajorStateIndicator +  
    β5.USorUKindicator + β6.PreviousIRR+ ε. 
Standard errors in brackets are corrected for heteroskedascity.  Dollar amounts are in millions unless otherwise stated. 
 
Dependant  variable:  fund  IRR  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 



























Log(seqBySeries)  .25 







2  -.49 
(3.27)    -.56 
(3.00)    -6.68 
(4.17) 
Log(seqByGP)   1.68 
(4.34)     
Log(seqByGP)
2   .25 
(1.55)     







(6.06)   








Vintage      - 
Stage (base is “All”)           
Seed       15.38 
(21.42) 
Early       41.88 
(18.94) 
Mezzanine       37.68 
(18.85) 
Expansion       36.50 
(18.62) 
Late       46.75 
(19.11) 
Region (base is “Americas”)            
Europe       12.57 
(8.08) 
Others       15.33 
(12.78) 
Investment scope (base is “All”)           
Venture  capital       -40.30 
(20.16) 
Focused       -33.01 
(25.15) 
Buyout       -54.11 
(21.31) 
Round  average       .03 
(.03) 
IRRt-1       
FOF indicator x IRRt-1       




GP  F.E.  No  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year  F.E  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1,256  1,183  1,253  724  709 
Adj R
3 (or pseudo likelihood ratio, for 
estimations using Heckman correction)  .07 .07 .07  -2320.7  -2225.5 
p-value of Wald test  .000  .000  .000  .000  .000   36
Table 7 – Comparison of Data Subsets with and without IRR Information 
This table shows the potential sample selection bias for datasets with IRR information, compared with the subset without 
the information.  Dollar amounts are in millions unless otherwise stated. 
 
(a) Funds dataset 
  With IRR Information  Without 
 N  Mean  S.D. Min  Max  N  Mean S.D. Min  Max 
t on null that 
means are 
the same 
Size 1,276  498  794  1  6,500 7,165 193  2,013 0  95,549  -5.34 
Vintage  1,379  1987  10  1935  2,004 7,449 1991 9 1936  2,004  15.77 
Round ave ($ 000)  984  11,889 32,487 6  460,92
8  5,286 3,584 20,220 2  1,040,00
0 
-10.59 
Fund HQ in one of CA, NY, 
MA, PA    1,734  .52  .50 0  1  7,925 .40  .49 0  1  -9.42 
Fund HQ in US or UK  1,734  .89  .31  0  1  7,925 .77  .42  0  1  -11.34 
IRR of previous fund in 
series  548 14.7 43.7 -94  513  523  1.5 38.4 -100  415  -5.27 
 
(b) LP-fund dataset 
  With IRR Information  Without 
LP  type  N Freq N Freq 
Z statistic for H0: 
same frequencies 
Banks/Financial Corp.  350  3.2  257  5.5  6.71 
Consultants/Gatekeepers 83  0.8  22  0.5  -2.05 
Educational Institutions  1,482  13.7  478  10.2  -5.89 
Foundation 372  3.4  171  3.7  0.73 
Fund of Funds  2,044  18.9  679  14.6  -6.46 
Government 3,646  33.6  1,023  21.9  -14.57 
Insurance 641  5.9  441  9.5  7.93 
Investment/Merchant Banks  473  4.4  335  7.2  7.24 
Non Financial Corporations  1,450  13.4  1,083  23.2  15.20 
Other Non Profits  204  1.9  90  1.9  0.20 
Other 101  0.9  89  1.9    5.07 
Total 10,846  100.0  4,668  100.0   
 
  With IRR Information  Without 
  N Mean  S.D. Min  Max  N Mean S.D. Min  Max 
t for H0 : 
same 
means 
Fund  vintage  1,158  1997 5 1978 2004  14,100 1991 9 1978  2004 -21.07 
Fund size  10,378  980  1,222 0.5  6,500  4,189 324  562  0.1  7,700  -33.33 
Round ave ($ 000)  8,567  20,965  46,282 6  460,928 2,686 9,313 33,444 7  322,772  -12.10 
Fund HQ in one of CA, 
NY, MA, PA   
10,846  0.63  0.48 0  1  4,668 0.50  0.50 0  1  -15.23 
Fund HQ in US or UK  10,846  0.97  0.16  0  1  4,668 0.79  0.41  0  1  -40.89 
IRR of previous fund 
in series 
656 15.4 44.9  -94.2 513.0  246 -5.6 24.8  -100.0 97.2  -6.92 
LP committed to fund  768  51  91  0  1,400  4,670 31  64  0  1,500  -7.58 
LP drawn from fund  614  21  102  -1,246 400  700  19  57  -291  841  -0.44 
LP  vintage  1,061  1990 8 1935  2001  12,670 1991 8 1935  2004  3.77 
Log(LP size)  1,160  64,252  62,551 72  149,300 11,615 16,093 35,063 0  300,000  -40.75 
LP %alloc to equity  976  50  15  25  72  5,829 53  12  3  89  7.73 
LP %alloc to fixed inc  976  25  10  9  40  5,848 26  10  2  100  3.09 
LP %alloc to pte equity  943  5  3  0  13  7,272 7  14  0  100  4.36 
LP %alloc to FOF  515  29  11  7  37  2,438 17  19  0  100  -14.13 
Num of funds per LP   1,168  208  136  1  410  14,346 45  56  1  410  -82.12 
Num of FOFs per LP  1,168  14  12  0  32  14,346 3  6  0  33  -58.23 
LP & GP in same state  1,168  0.24  0.43  0.00  1.00  14,346 0.18  0.38  0.00  1.00  -5.52 
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Table 8 – Performance of FOFs among LPs 
This table shows how the fund IRR in LP-fund observations correlates with a number of explanatory variables.  Model (1) 
uses OLS, while the rest use the Heckit procedure, whose selection model is: 
ProbabilitySelected = βo + β1.log(FundSize) + β2.FundVintage + β3.RoundAverage + Σβ4.MajorStateIndicator +  
    β5.USorUKindicator + β6.PreviousIRR+ ε. 
 
Standard errors in brackets are corrected for heteroskedascity.  Dollar amounts are in millions unless otherwise stated. 
 
  Dependant var: IRR for LP-
fund pairs 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Educational Institutions  9.69 (6.07)  3.87 (6.54)  4.64 (6.54)  5.41 (6.44)  5.91 (6.28) 
Financial Institution  2.52 (6.09)  -9.03 (8.65) -8.58 (8.56) -8.88 (8.40) -8.84 (8.45) 
Foundation  7.37 (6.37)  1.57 (7.61)  1.84 (7.63)  3.30 (8.34)  3.68 (8.31) 
Fund of Funds  -1.93 (5.97) -2.63 (6.37) -2.45 (6.35) -1.47 (6.19) -1.21 (6.26) 
Government  5.72 (6.06)  5.60 (6.52)  6.57 (6.35)  6.04 (7.62)  6.13 (7.69) 































Other Non Profits  4.55 (6.88)  -2.98 (9.91) -2.38 (9.78) .73 (9.34)  .99 (9.31) 
  Indicator for FOF-usage      -1.41 (.38)  17.33 (6.24) 17.13 (6.22) 
Educational Institutions        -18.98 (6.24) -18.93 (6.32) 
Financial Institution        -16.77 (7.89) -16.65 (7.92) 
Foundation        -21.51 (6.96) -21.52 (6.75) 
Fund of Funds        -22.31 (8.83) -22.17 (8.76) 
Government        -17.40 (8.59) -17.28 (8.43) 




























Other Non Profits        -24.37 (7.44) -24.58 (7.26) 
  Indicator for FOF-fund          -21.13 (6.54) 
Educational  Institutions       4.72  (12.83) 
Financial  Institution       -.98  (8.80) 
Foundation       20.51  (6.38) 
Fund  of  Funds       11.87  (2.74) 
Government       20.45  (3.96) 



























Other  Non  Profits       -5.56  (7.87) 
  FOF-usage  x  FOF-fund       4.72  (12.83) 
Educational  Institutions       7.53  (13.60) 
Financial  Institution       .63  (15.56) 
Foundation       
Fund  of  Funds       .59  (9.54) 
Government       -.08  (9.99) 







































Other  Non  Profits       38.05  (16.74) 
  LP vintage  -.06 (.08)  -.12 (.04)  -.12 (.04)  -.11 (.04)  -.11 (.04) 
  LP and GP in same state  -.56 (1.41)  -.42 (1.16)  -.45 (1.14)  -.41 (1.15)  -.49 (1.16) 
  NASDAQ level  -.01 (.00)  -.01 (.00)  -.01 (.00)  -.01 (.00)  -.01 (.00) 
  Log(LP size)  -.13 (.29)  .51 (.58)  .57 (.59)  .54 (.59)  .53 (.58) 







  Indicators for LP location by 
state 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Year  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Fund  stage  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 












  Pseudo LR ratio  354.6 (Wald) -41,851  -41,851  -41,848  -41,844 
  p-value of Wald test  .000  .001  .001  .001  .000 
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Table 9 – Statistical and Economic Significance of Joint-tests on FOF-usage and LP Type 
This table shows the joint tests of whether the use of funds of funds (FOFs) and limited partner (LP) type are significant.  It 
is for Model (4) in Table 8, where the specification is (Ind = indicator operator): 
 
IRR of LP-fund pair = βo + β1.Ind(LP types) + 
 β2 Ind(LP is FOF-user) + β 3.Ind(LP types) x Ind(LP is FOF-user) + 
β4 LPvintage + β 5.Ind(LP & GP in same state)+ β6.NASDAQlevel + β7.Log(LP size) + ε. 
The Heckman correction procedure is used, with the selection model: 
ProbabilitySelected = βo + β1.log(FundSize) + β2.FundVintage + β3.RoundAverage + Σβ4.MajorStateIndicator +  
    β5.USorUKindicator + β6.PreviousIRR+ ε. 
 
“Economic significance” is based on the mean levels of the appropriate variables concerned.  The mean IRR is 4.99%. 
 
  Statistical Significance  Economic Significance 
Interaction of FOF-usage with LP 
type indicators 
Χ
2  for H0: both 
coeff=0  p-value 
∂IRR/∂FOFusage for  
FOFusage 
Consultants/Gatekeepers 7.71  0.0055  17.3 
Educational Institutions  16.55  0.0003  -1.7 
Financial Institution   26.37  0.0000  0.6 
Foundation   9.67  0.0079  -4.2 
Fund of Funds  9.53  0.0085  -5.0 
Government 37.45  0.0000  -0.1 
Non Financial Corporations  79.49  0.0000  0.4 
Other Non Profits  18.82  0.0001  -7.0 
 
 
Table 10 – FOF Performance Compared in Two Ways 
This table shows two comparisons of FOF performance.  In the user-non-user comparison, I compare the performance of 
the non-FOFs portfolios of FOF-using LPs and non-using LPs.  This tells whether FOF-using LPs (disregarding the 
performance generated by their FOF portfolios) are stronger than non-users.  In the intra-user comparison, I compare the 
performance of the FOF and non-FOF portfolios of FOF-using LPs.  This tells whether FOFs deliver value condition on 
LPs’ using them.  The full estimation is in Model (5) of Table 8, where the specification is (Ind = indicator operator): 
 
IRR of LP-fund pair = βo + β1.Ind(LP types) + 
 β2 Ind(LP is FOF-user) + β 3.Ind(LP types) x Ind(LP is FOF-user) + 
β4 Ind(fund is FOF) + β 5.Ind(LP types) x Ind(fund is FOF) + 
β6 Ind(fund is FOF)x Ind(LP is FOF-user + 
β7.Ind(LP types) x Ind(fund is FOF)x Ind(LP is FOF-user) + 
β8 LPvintage + β 9Ind(LP & GP in same state)+ β10.NASDAQlevel + β11.Log(LP size) + ε. 
The Heckman correction procedure is used, with the selection model: 
ProbabilitySelected = βo + β1.log(FundSize) + β2.FundVintage + β3.RoundAverage + Σβ4.MajorStateIndicator +  




Do FOF-users pick regular funds better 
than non-users?  (IRR bp) 
Intra-user comparison: 
Do FOFs do better than non-FOFs? 
(IRR bp) 
Consultants/Gatekeepers 17.1  -16.4 
Educational Institutions  -1.8  -4.1 
Financial Institution  0.5  -16.7 
Foundation -4.4  4.1 
Fund of Funds  Not applicable  Not applicable 
Government -0.1  4.0 
Non Financial Corporations  0.4  -3.1 
Other Non Profits  -7.4  16.1 
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Table 11 – Size Effect on Performance 
This table uses IRR as the dependant variable.  In the user-non-user comparison, I compare the performance of the non-
FOFs portfolios of FOF-using LPs and non-using LPs.  This tells whether FOF-using LPs (disregarding the performance 
generated by their FOF portfolios) are stronger than non-users.  In the intra-user comparison, I compare the performance 
of the FOF and non-FOF portfolios of FOF-using LPs.  This tells whether FOFs deliver value condition on LPs’ using them.   
The Heckman correction procedure is used, with the selection model: 
ProbabilitySelected = βo + β1.log(FundSize) + β2.FundVintage + β3.RoundAverage + Σβ4.MajorStateIndicator +  
    β5.USorUKindicator + β6.PreviousIRR+ ε. 
 
Standard errors in brackets are corrected for heteroskedascity.  Dollar amounts are in millions unless otherwise stated. 
 
   User-non-user   Intra-user   
  Dependant var: IRR for LP-fund 
pairs 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Educational Institutions  8.68 (6.30)  5.38 (4.89)  23.19 (25.50)  6.05 (9.40) 
Financial Institution  -8.54 (8.81)  -7.83 (8.56)  3.33 (15.80)  -5.57 (3.17) 
Foundation  6.75 (7.72)  3.73 (7.02)  8.31 (21.29)  3.87 (12.13) 
Fund of Funds  1.16 (6.37)  -1.42 (5.31)  -1.91 (15.49)  -12.74 (3.85) 
Government  6.92 (7.99)  -4.67 (10.11)  18.67 (19.12)  -2.27 (6.37) 



























Other Non Profits  1.93 (10.52)  -1.17 (10.58)  5.43 (24.71)  -.76 (7.54) 
  Indicator for FOF-usage  17.87 (6.45)  -3.11 (11.97)     
Educational Institutions  -17.31 (5.82)  3.79 (11.17)     
Financial Institution  -19.78 (9.55)  5.26 (10.34)     
Foundation  -24.23 (7.80)  4.44 (18.96)     
Fund of Funds  -22.72 (9.13)  -4.12 (8.23)     
Government  -18.55 (10.66)  4.71 (12.09)     




























Other Non Profits  -27.52 (8.44)  -.79 (11.52)     
  Indicator for FOF-fund      18.46 (3.01)  -4.54 (16.91) 
Educational Institutions      -47.15 (8.83)  -26.80 (19.65) 
Financial Institution      -14.93 (19.56)   
Foundation      
Fund of Funds      -16.98 (8.81)  -1.40 (19.39) 
Government      -19.59 (3.67)  1.49 (16.09) 



























Other Non Profits        7.09 (22.86) 
  Log(LP size)  .56 (.73)  -.62 (.25)  .29 (.46)  -.74 (.59) 
  Log(fund size)    2.58 (6.20)    4.82 (6.91) 
 Log(fund  size)
2   -.83  (.73)  -.97  (.78) 
  LP vintage  -.16 (.06)  -.10 (.06)  -.04 (.07)  .02 (.11) 
  LP and GP in same state  .43 (1.09)  -1.52 (.60)  -1.06 (.77)  -3.54 (1.51) 
  NASDAQ level  .002 (.003)  .003 (.003)  .0004 (.0037)  .00 (.00) 
  Inverse Mill’s ratio (lambda)  47.54 (17.74)  -.90 (.68)  49.17 (19.03)  -.97 (.80) 
  Indicators for LP location by state  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
  Year  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  Fund  stage  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 












  Pseudo LR ratio  -30,407  -30,719  -16,976  -17.161 
  p-value of Wald test  .000  .333  .000  .378 
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Table 12 – Summary of Executive Profiles in Money Management Firms, 2004 
This table compares the profiles of executives in a random sample of 706 money management firms, out of over 1,700 in 
the full set in Nelson Information’s Investment Managers.  Data such as age, experience and “years with firm” are in years. 
 
 N  Mean  S.D.  Min  Max 
All in dataset         
Private equity or VC firms?  706  10%       
FOF firm?  706  3%       
Age (median among executives)  597  48.9  8.0  27  74 
Experience (median)  685  22.4  7.3  2  50 
Years with firm (median)  692  9.2  7.0  1  35.5 
Age (max among executives)  597  60.7  9.6  27  90 
Experience (max)  685  35.5  8.7  2  74 
Years with firm (max)  692  18.3  12.1  1  58 
Within private equity and VC firms         
FOF firms?  68  34%       
Age (median among executives)  45  48.0  5.0  33  61 
Experience (median)  54  20.6  5.0  7.5  32 
Years with firm (median)  57  7.0  5.3  1  20 
Age (max among executives)  45  57.6  8.1  41  73 
Experience (max)  54  32.3  8.1  15  49 
Years with firm (max)  57  15.7  10.4  1  42 
Within private equity and VC FOFs         
Age (median among executives)  18  46.8  6.0  33  61 
Experience (median)  23  20.5  5.0  7.5  32 
Years with firm (median)  23  7.2  4.4  1  14 
Age (max among executives)  18  55.9  8.7  41  73 
Experience (max)  23  31.7  8.7  15  49 
Years with firm (max)  23  15.4  7.6  4  32 
 
Table 13 – Test of Equality of Means of Executive Experience and Age 
This table does a t-test to see whether the means from the data in Table 12 are significantly different. 
  t p-value 
Between those in FOFs and other money managers (private equity/VC or not)    
Age (median among executives)  1.113  .266 
Experience (median)  1.308  .191 
Years with firm (median)  1.403  .161 
Age (max among executives)  2.144  .032 
Experience (max)  2.184 .029 
Years with firm (max)  1.156  .248 
Between those in FOFs and other private equity/VC     
Age (median among executives)  1.306  .199 
Experience (median)  0.081  .936 
Years with firm (median)  -0.182  .856 
Age (max among executives)  1.151  .256 
Experience (max)  0.501 .619 
Years with firm (max)  0.163  .871   41
Table 14 – Summary of Differences in Access 
Access is measured by (the negative of) lateness, which is the year an LP gets into a fund minus the year the fund is 
started.  Therefore, the smaller the number (less late), the better the access. 
* The cut-off in absolute access is to ensure that the lateness/earliness figures do not become so big that they represent 
most likely long-term open-ended funds rather than close-end ones. 
 
 
    Cut-off in absolute access* 
  All  10 years  5 years  3 years 
User-non-user comparison      
















t statistic  -0.94  -5.61  -3.29  -2.78 
p-value .347  .000  .001  .0055 
Intra-user comparison      
















t statistic  20.19  28.83  13.66  8.78 




Table 15 – Effect of Access on Performance 
Access is measured by (the negative of) lateness, which is the year an LP gets into a fund minus the year the fund is 
started.  Therefore, the smaller the number, the better access. 
The Heckman correction procedure is used, with the selection model: 
ProbabilitySelected = βo + β1.log(FundSize) + β2.FundVintage + β3.RoundAverage + Σβ4.MajorStateIndicator +  
    β5.USorUKindicator + β6.PreviousIRR+ ε. 
* The absolute access difference limit is to ensure that the lateness/earliness figures do not become so big that they 
represent most likely long-term open-ended funds rather than close-end ones. 
 
 User-non-user    Intra-user   
Dependant var: IRR for LP-fund pairs  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Indicator for FOF user  .18 (.76)  3.35 (1.96)     
Indicator for FOF fund     -3.62 (5.94)  22.09 (3.07) 
Lateness*   1.66  (.24)   2.03 (.26) 
Lateness x log(fund size)   -.20  (.04)   -.24 (.04) 
LP vintage  -.07 (.06)  .25 (.09)  -.09 (.03)  .09 (.11) 
LP and GP in same state  .27 (1.27)  .69 (.95)  -1.45 (.93)  -.79 (1.91) 
NASDAQ level  .0009 (.0036)  .01 (.02)  .003 (.005)  .01 (.01) 
Log(LP size)  1.04 (.63)  1.74 (1.24)  1.00 (.35)  .76 (.37) 
Inverse Mill’s ratio (lambda)  47.51 (17.99)  56.13 (23.26)  48.64 (18.91)  56.76 (22.53) 
Indicators for LP location by state  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 













Pseudo LR ratio  -30,446  -15,394  -17,275  -11,586 
p-value of Wald test  .000  .000  .000  .378 
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Table 16 – Test of Diversification as a Motive for Using FOFs 
This table shows whether a measure of diversification is correlated with the use of funds of funds (FOFs) and other explanatory variables.  In the user-non-user comparison, I compare 
the performance of the non-FOFs portfolios of FOF-using LPs and non-using LPs.  This tells whether FOF-using LPs (disregarding the performance generated by their FOF portfolios) 
are stronger than non-users.  In the intra-user comparison, I compare the performance of the FOF and non-FOF portfolios of FOF-using LPs.  This tells whether FOFs deliver value 
condition on LPs’ using them.  The “before and after FOF” test uses an indicator variable to undertake an event study. 








Dependant var (total 
per LP, logs taken) 
Funds PCs Funds PCs Funds PCs Funds PCs  PCs  PCs 
  (1)  (2) (1a)  (2a) (3)  (4) (3a)  (4a) (5)  (6) 










    
Indicator for FOF user x 







    
Indicator for FOF user x 







    
Indicator for FOF fund 
  









Indicator for FOF fund x 
log(LP size)    







Indicator for FOF fund x 
log(fund size)     







Indicator for after-event 
FOF use     
    
 




Indicator for FOF fund x 
log(fund size)     
    
 
    1.48 
(.32) 
LP  location  by  state  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No  No 
Year  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No  No 
Fund  stage  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Investment  scope  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Events  FE  No No No No No No No No  Yes  Yes 
N  6,762 5,881 6,762 5,881 3,843 3,346 3,740 3,251  253  250 
Adjusted R
2  56.9% 33.2% 58.2% 33.3% 37.8% 33.0% 52.5% 33.1%  2.7%  0.6% 




Table 17 – Test of the Sub-scale Explanation 
This table looks at whether LPs use FOFs to (successfully) overcome sub-scale operations.  Dollar amounts are in millions unless 
otherwise stated. “PC” = portfolio company. 
(a) Do FOFs Deliver Value to Subscale (small) LPs? 







Indicator for FOF-usage  5.46 (3.12)  8.19 (4.00)  5.13 (3.20)  7.73 (4.00) 
Log(LP size)  2.00 (1.18)  .12 (.39)  1.43 (.36)  .11 (.39) 
FOF-usage x log(LP size)  -.18 (.42)  -1.11 (1.85)  -.20 (.43)  -1.08 (.51) 
Log(fund size)    .13 (1.85)    .22 (1.85) 
Log(fund size)
2   -.46  (.15)  -.46  (.15) 
LP vintage    -.10 (.08)    -.16 (.08) 
LP and GP in same state    -1.63 (1.49)    -1.52 (1.49) 
NASDAQ  level   -.0047  (.0015)  -.0048  (.0014) 
Inverse Mill’s ratio (lambda)  49.2 (18.2)  -2.68 (.55)    -2.44 (.56) 
Indicators for LP location by state  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Year  FE  No Yes No Yes 













Pseudo LR ratio  -34,669  -31,975  -36,937  -31,956 
p-value of Wald test  .0001  .0001  .000  .378 
 
(b) Are Agency Effects Present? 
  Dependant var:  Reinvest in next fund, 
conditional on a next fund? 
Num of PCs in 
fund 
Log (ave round 
amount) 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  IRR  .0017 (.0010)  .10 (.15)     
  Indicator for FOF-using LP  .31 (.06)  .31 (.06)     
  Indicator for FOF fund  -4.46 (.29)  -4.27 (.21)  9.30 (3.67)  -.87 (.22) 
  Interaction of above two  3.98 (.23)  4.17 (.18)     
Indicator for FOF-using LP    -.022 (.008)     







Interaction of above two    -.001 (.005)     
  Log (fund size)  .23 (.16)  .25 (.17)  4.13 (.74)  .39 (.02) 
  Log (fund size) 
2  -.019 (.016)  -.021 (.016)     
  LP vintage  -.0009 (.0039)  -.0002 (.0042)     
  LP and GP in same state  .013 (.082)  -.004 (.086)     
  NASDAQ  .0022 (.0002)  .002 (.0002)  .001 (.002)  .0001 (.0002) 
  Log (LP size)  .06 (.01)  .06 (.02)     
  Indicators for LP location by state  Yes  Yes     
  Indicators for LP type  Yes  Yes     
  Interaction of IRR with all above?  No  Yes     
  Indicators for fund location by state      Yes  Yes 
  Fund sequence number      .33 (.11)  .008 (.010) 
  Fund vintage      -.20 (.10)  -.01 (.01) 
  Inverse Mill’s ratio (lambda)  .59 (1.00)  .74 (1.02)     
  Cluster  by  GP  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  Year  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  Fund stage FE  Yes  Yes  No  No 
  Investment scope FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
  N  3,584 3,584 1.823 1,794 
  Pseudo R
2  24.9% 25.4% 35.7% 56.3% 
  p-value of Wald test  .000  .000  .000  .000   45
Table 18 – Test of the Downward Scaling Explanation 
This table shows the results of a test of whether large LPs face a trade-off in downward scaling, which is to push out large volumes of 
investments over a short period of time.  The trade-off is between spreading investment over many  FOFs and risking coordination 
problems among them, versus not staging investments in one FOF and risking getting held up.  “Staging” is measured by the dependant 
variable, which is the maximum sequence number among the funds run by a GP for an LP.  “Spreading out” is measured by the number 
of FOFs by an LP.  “Captive FOFs” are those organized by GPs for single LPs. 
 
Dependant var:  Max sequence number 
for GP’s funds 
Number of FOFs by LP  -1.13 
(.078) 
Number of non-FOFs by LP  .076 
(.0007) 
NASDAQ Index  -.0006 
(.0005) 
Average excess IRR for sequence of funds by this GP  -.06 
(.020) 
Captive FOFs?  .14 
(.0003) 
Log (amount LP allocates to private equity)  .58 
(.11) 
Log (amount LP allocates to FOFs)  -.51 
(.21) 
Indicators for LP location by state  Yes 
Indicators for LP state  Yes 
Indicators for LP vintage  Yes 
Cluster by LP  Yes 
N 92 
Pseudo R
2  45.5% 
p-value of Wald test  .000   46
Table 19 – Test of the Governance Explanation 
This table shows whether the use of funds of funds (FOFs) can be explained by different types of LPs, which have different governance 
structures. 
 
Dependant var:  FOF-usage 
Indicators for LP type (based=consultants)   
Educational Institutions  1.37 
 (.96) 








Non Financial Corporations  1.12 
 (.84) 
Other Non Profits  1.17 
 (.81) 
LP vintage  -.001 
 (.012) 
Log (LP size)  .22 
 (.06) 
Allocation of private equity  .00049 
 (.00885) 
NASDAQ level  .0017 
 (.0059) 
Indicators for LP location by state  No 
Year FE  No 
N 7,930 
Pseudo R
2  21.2% 
p-value of Wald test  .000 
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Table 20 – Test of the Learning Explanation 
In panel (a), I test for whether FOF usage can be explained by young LPs or LPs venturing into new areas.  The latter is measured by 
an indicator on whether the LP is a first-timer into new investment areas for a particular LP-year observation.  Model (1) uses probit 
estimation.  Model (2) uses SUR (seemingly unrelated regression) estimation.  Other controls include log(LP size), log(fund size), LP 
vintage, whether LP and GP are in the same state, NASDAQ level. 
 
In panel (b), I test whether allocation to private equity without using FOFs changes with the duration of the experience with FOFs and 
the performance of that FOF experience.  Other controls include log(LP size), LP vintage, NASDAQ level. 
 






Usage of FOF by investment scope 
   Mixed  Buyout  Focused  VC 










Indicator for being first-timer 
 All  types 
-.74 









































Other  controls*  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Indicators  for  LP  type  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Indicators for LP location by state  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Fund  stage  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  8,917 9,222 9,222 9,222 9,222 
Pseudo R
2  38.6% 49.8% 42.0% 20.5% 38.5% 
p-value of Wald test  .000  .000  .000  .000  .000 
 
 
(b) Learning or Outsourcing? 
  Experience with which type of FOFs? 




























Other  controls*  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Indicators  for  LP  type  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Indicators for LP location by state  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
LP  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  899 899 291 138 
R
2  27.0% 27.2% 84.9% 52.4% 
p-value of Wald test  .02  .61  .01  .00   48
Figure 1 – FOF Usage and Investments in FOFs 



















For FOFusers, how do their FOF investments do 
versus their non-FOF investments?
∂ IRR /  ∂ FOFfund |FOFuser=1 = (α+β+γ) – α = β+γ
User-non-user comparison:
How do FOF users do versus non-users in 
selecting non-FOF (regular) funds?





(b) Mapping Above to a Simplifying Picture 
 
FOF-users Non-users LPs:
Funds: FOFs Regular Regular
FOFs (most of which 


















FOF users: how 




User-non-user comparison - 
How much do FOF-users 
outperform non-users in picking 











Note that “Non-financial corp” and “Foundations,” indicated by triangles rather than circles, do not have coefficients for the interaction 
with FOFusagexFOFfund due to collinearity, and the placement in the plot above assumes a zero coefficient.  The plot might be better 
considered without these two, but I place them here for completeness. 
 









1 – Does use of 
FOFs increase 
diversification?
1 – Does use of 
FOFs increase 
diversification?
2 – Does use of 
FOF increase 
effective scale
2 – Does use of 
FOF increase 
effective scale  50
































Figure 5 – Performance versus Learning 
Short-term orientation
(learning)
Good returns → positive 
learning experience, 
reduce out-sourcing
Poor returns → negative experience 
(try another FOF, or quit this area)
Long-term orientation
(performance)
Poor returns → in-house
Good returns → out-source
LP experience 




to new area 
(% total 
commit)
Poor FOF returns; 
manage in-house
Good FOF returns; 
out-source
Performance story Learning story
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